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Abstract
This paper examines the impact of the UK housing benefit system on the financial returns to
employment of people in local authority or Housing Association accommodation. It outlines the
current structure of housing benefit and examines its effects on the returns to employment using
data from the Family Expenditure Survey. It analyses the consequences of a number of reforms to
the current system — lowering social rents, increasing the levels of housing benefit received in
work and restricting the amount of rent covered by housing benefit payments. This analysis
highlights the trade-offs involved in various strategies available for restructuring the present
system.
JEL classification: H3, H4, J3.
I. INTRODUCTION
Currently, about 24 per cent of households are social tenants, living either in local
authority accommodation (20 per cent) or the Housing Association (HA) sector (4
per cent). The size, relative income, economic and demographic compositions of
these groups have changed dramatically in the past 20 years. Social tenants are
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more than twice as likely as the average to be out of work. Nearly half of male
household heads under the age of 65 in the social sector are unwaged. Over three-
quarters of social tenant families are in the poorest two quintiles of the population
income distribution.
That social tenants are so much poorer than families in other tenures is a
relatively recent phenomenon. Up until the end of the 1970s, social tenants had
incomes slightly below the average. The relative decline in social tenants’ incomes
has resulted, in part, from richer tenants leaving the sector as a result of
government ‘right-to-buy’ policies; in part, because it has become a requirement of
entry to the social sector to have low income; and, in part, because of other
changes in the economy, in particular the increase in unemployment in the early
1980s.
1
Low levels of employment participation amongst social tenants have been
accompanied by rapid increases in rent levels, as government policy pushed
council and HA rents up towards market levels. Higher rents also caused higher
housing benefit (HB) payments. The result was that HB was one of the fastest-
growing elements of social security spending: payments of rent rebates to local
authority tenants were expected to reach £5.47 billion in 1995–96, up from £0.84
billion in 1980–81.
2
Rent increases reduced the effective returns to employment of a group that
already faced low earnings levels. It resulted in a growing potential for
unemployment traps and poverty traps because, as social tenants’ incomes rise,
HB payments are withdrawn. The higher the rent level, the higher must gross
earnings be to escape the HB taper.
In this paper, we concentrate on the financial returns to work in the social
rented sector. This work moves beyond simply looking at the effect of the benefit
system on hypothetical families. Rather, we attempt to quantify the financial
returns to work using survey data on a representative sample of the social renting
population. We use this framework to examine the effects of a number of possible
reforms to the benefit system.
We start in Section II by describing the structure of housing benefit. We show
how this structure has a large impact on the net returns to work. Section III
discusses a number of possible ways of quantifying these effects for the population
of social tenants. Section IV applies these measures to several years of Family
Expenditure Survey data, using the IFS tax and benefit model (see Giles and
McCrae (1995)) to estimate the relationship between incomes in and out of work.
In Section V, we consider the effects of a number of possible reforms to the
benefit system, and we conclude in Section VI with a discussion of the merits of
different policy directions.
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II. THE STRUCTURE OF HOUSING BENEFIT
Housing benefit is means-tested and is designed to pay some or all of a tenant’s
rent when out of work or on low income. It is payable to private tenants as well as
Housing Association and local authority tenants. In what follows, we concentrate
on HB as it affects social tenants, though most of the discussion would also be
valid for tenants in the private sector. The main difference for private sector
tenants relates to the rules for the proportion of rent that is allowable for HB. In
the private sector, this can often be below 100 per cent as a result of changes to
private sector HB regulations which were tightened in an effort to contain
spending on HB.
The actual rules for determining HB eligibility are detailed and complex, but
the basic formula for its calculation is relatively straightforward:
(1) HB = Rent – (Taper % Excess income) – Non-dependant deduction
where excess income is defined as follows:
(2) Excess income = (Earnings – Disregard) + Other income – Needs.
Earnings are net of income tax and National Insurance contributions. The
disregard is £5 for a single person, £10 for a couple and £25 for a lone parent.
Other income includes most social security benefits, such as child benefit and
family credit, but also pension payments which, considering the number of
pensioners in receipt of HB, is an important consideration. Needs are set by statute
at levels that vary by family composition, number of children and so on; they are
generally set at the same level as the rate of income support so that for people on
income support, excess income equals zero and full rent is paid.
The taper in equation (1) has been set equal to 65 per cent since the
introduction of the current HB system in 1988. Some of the effects of this way of
calculating HB should be clear immediately. An increase in rent, for anyone
currently on HB, results in an increase in HB of the same amount as the rent
increase. An increase of £1 in net earnings results in a fall of 65 pence in HB
entitlement. So, taking into account the income tax and National Insurance
systems, a basic-rate taxpayer receiving HB would need to earn £1.51 to see a 35
pence rise in their income.
There are some other complications, the most notable being non-dependant
deductions (NDDs) and capital limits. A NDD is an amount that is deducted from
housing benefit when there are other people besides the claimant’s partner and
dependent children living in the household. It is assumed that this represents the
contribution to the rent that this person makes, whether or not this contribution is
actually made. For many families, these NDDs are an important consideration in
calculating their HB entitlements. They have an effect both on their living
standards and on their financial returns from employment.Fiscal Studies
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In addition, capital limits operate such that any HB claimant with capital in
excess of £16,000 is ineligible for HB, and a claimant with capital lower than
£16,000 but greater than £3,000 will have their weekly HB entitlement reduced by
£1 for every £250 of capital over £3,000.
The main features of the system that it is important to notice are, first, that for
anyone on HB, any rise in rent is fully covered by a rise in the HB payment and,
second, that for every extra pound of take-home pay (after tax and National
Insurance), net income will rise by only 35 pence because of the 65 per cent taper.
Housing Benefit and Returns to Work
There are many ways of illustrating the effects of HB on returns to work, and we
illustrate one of them here using the budget constraint for an example family with
two children, rent of £40 per week and one partner earning £6 per hour.
In Figure 1, the total height of each bar represents total net income at that
number of hours of work. The constituent parts of each bar represent a particular
type of income. In each case, the bottom chunk represents child benefit whose
level never varies with hours of work. The solid black area represents income
support which runs out at 16 hours of work per week. Just below this is take-home
pay and above it is HB. The white bars from 16 hours on represent family credit.
For ease of interpretation, we ignore council tax benefit.
3
                                                                                                                             
3The effect of council tax benefit is taken into account in our empirical results.
FIGURE 1
Decomposition of Income for Example Household
on £6 per Hour with Rent of £40 per Week
Title:  Johnson fig 1
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:17 amHousing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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At zero hours, the couple receive £107.05 in income support, £19.60 in child
benefit and £40 in housing benefit. This HB covers the whole of their rent, so in
effect they face a net rent of zero. If one partner were to work 16 hours or more,
then the family becomes ineligible for income support. As there are children, at
this point it becomes entitled to family credit. If the worker has a job that pays £6
per hour, then at 16 hours the family receives nearly £59 in family credit. If we
ignore HB for the moment, the family’s net income would jump by £37.92
between 15 hours of employment and 16 hours, as the amount of family credit it
becomes entitled to exceeds the amount of its lost income support.
This is the point of family credit — to create a jump in income when
individuals work 16 hours per week.
4 But there is one complication. Family credit
counts as income in the HB means test. While on income support, the family had
the whole of its rent covered by HB. But once one adult works 16 hours, HB only
covers £13.40 of the rent. The remaining £26.60 must be paid from the family’s
other income. Taking account of this extra rent that has to be paid, the household’s
net income only increases by £11.32. So the existence of HB limits the impact of
family credit on the family’s budget constraint.
The potential problem of limited rewards from further hours of work is amply
illustrated by this example. Despite a gross wage of £6 per hour, 40 hours of work
a week make this family only about £40 better off than no work at all — an
effective wage rate of just £1 per hour.
The importance of the wage rate is illustrated in Figure 2. In this case, instead
of assuming wages of £6 per hour, we assume a wage of £12 per hour, rather
above the national average. The returns from work in this case are much higher
since eligibility for HB runs out at about 16 hours of work.
We could present infinite numbers of alternative example budget constraints
with different levels of rent, different earnings or different family structure. But it
would not be an adequate way to proceed. First, the representations depend upon
the particular situation of the example family chosen. More importantly, such
diagrams give no clear representation of the population as a whole. For instance,
only 6 per cent of families in the UK are comprised of two adults, only one of
whom works, with children. Yet this is often referred to as the typical or average
family type.
Better is to consider summary measures of the effects of the benefit system on
a representative sample of the social renter population. We draw this sample from
the Family Expenditure Survey (FES) — an annual survey of a representative
sample of the UK population. We describe their financial returns to employment
through the use of a number of common measures of the impact of the benefit
system, the properties of which are described in the next section.
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III. MEASURES OF WELFARE DEPENDENCY
Before we explain the calculation of simple summary measures of welfare
dependency, it is necessary to consider the appropriate measure of income.
1. Measuring Income
The measures of welfare dependency used in this paper depend on comparing
incomes in and out of work. Naturally, the appropriate comparison is between net
incomes (after tax and National Insurance contributions). But we also need to use
a measure of income that is net of housing costs. In principle, this is because the
rent level is set by government decision and housing expenditure is a necessity for
individuals, so rent acts very much like a tax that has to be paid regardless of
other consumption choices. To see the need for this treatment, consider the
situation of a household receiving £100 in income support and getting full housing
benefit to cover its rent of £30 per week. The household’s before-housing-cost
(BHC) income is £130 per week, while its after-housing-costs (AHC) income is
£100 (£100 + £30 HB – £30 gross rent). Now suppose the household’s rent
increased to £50. It would now receive £50 in HB which increases its BHC income
to £150. Its AHC income would remain the same, at £100. So, on a BHC
measure, the rent increase appears to make the household better off, while an AHC
measure suggests that the increase has no effect on its well-being.
FIGURE 2
Decomposition of Income for Example Household
on £12 per Hour with Rent of £40 per Week
Title:  Johnson fig 2
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:18 amHousing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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The household is indeed unaffected directly by this rent increase. It is still
living in the same accommodation for which it pays no net rent, as gross rent is
met in full by HB. Additionally, it still has £100 to spend on other consumption.
Of course, if the household were not on HB, the rent increase would make it worse
off. Again, we require an AHC measure to capture this, as the household’s BHC
income would be unaffected by the rent increase. Rent policy can be seen as an
extension of the government’s benefit policy as well as an integral part of its
housing policy.
A second issue that arises is the sharing of income and housing costs within
households and families. We assume that families share all income within their
immediate family unit. We take the same definition of a person’s immediate family
as is used by the benefit system — that is, the person, their partner (if any) and
any dependent children.
Where there is more than one family unit in a household, there is an issue about
who actually pays the housing costs. One common assumption is that all housing
costs are met by the ‘main’ family unit in the household. However, the benefit
system assumes that other family units make contributions to housing costs and
this is reflected in non-dependant deductions from benefits. In the absence of any
actual data on how housing costs are shared, we assume that each additional
family unit pays rent equal to its appropriate non-dependant deduction, with the
remainder of the rent being met by the ‘main’ family unit.
5 For most results, this
assumption makes little difference.
2. Measures of Financial Returns to Employment
The average tax rate (ATR) measures the proportion of a person’s gross earnings
that is taken in direct taxes and lost benefit entitlements. It is calculated as the
ratio of the increase in net income from taking up a job to the gross earnings that
the job provides. Take, for instance, the example family considered earlier in
Figure 1. At zero hours, the family’s BHC income is £166.65. With £40 rent, its
AHC income is £126.65. Now, were the person to work 40 hours at £6 per hour,
their gross earnings would be £240. But after paying income tax and National
Insurance contributions and having benefit entitlements reduced, the family’s net
AHC income would increase by only £42.49 to £169.14. The ATR faced by the
family would therefore be 82.3 per cent (i.e. 1 – 42.49/240). In other words, over
four-fifths of gross earnings would be lost in tax and reduced benefits. The
average tax rate measures the proportion of gross earnings that is effectively
withdrawn by the tax and benefit systems.
A related notion is that of the replacement rate (RR). This is the ratio of the net
income out of work to the net income in work at a particular hours and wage level.
Again, we take our example family and consider the case of one partner working
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40 hours at £6 per hour. Its net AHC income will be £126.65 out of work and
£169.14 in work. Thus its replacement rate will be 74.9 per cent (126.65/169.14).
This can be interpreted as meaning that were the person to give up working, their
income would be about 75 per cent of their in-work income.
ATRs are a description of the effective relationship between net and gross
returns to work. The most significant difference between these and RRs is that
RRs are affected by the level of out-of-work income as well as the size of the
return to working. In certain situations, particularly where a spouse is working,
this will be important. So family income out of work might be quite high because
one member of the family works. If that person is earning £300 per week, then the
numerator in the RR fraction will be large and the RR will be high as a result. The
ATR will not be directly affected. This indicates that RRs pick up income effects
that are not picked up by ATRs. That is, having a high out-of-work income
decreases the incentive to work, even given a low or nil ATR.
Another measure that is often reported is the marginal tax rate (MTR). This
measures the amount by which net income would increase were a person to earn
an extra £1 of gross income. Suppose somebody is paying income tax and
National Insurance and is receiving HB and family credit. Their MTR is
calculated as follows:
Gross earnings increase by £1
Income tax rises by 24p
National Insurance rises by 10p
So after-tax earnings rise by 66p
Family credit falls by 70% of 66p = 46.2p
HB falls by 65% of the remaining 19.8p = 12.87p
Final gain is 66 – 46.2 – 12.87 = 6.93p
The marginal tax rate is 93.07%
The MTR indicates the change in net income from a small shift in the amount a
person works. At high MTRs, there is little gain to a person from working an extra
hour. Where very high MTRs exist over a wide range of income, several extra
hours of work may yield very little, and reducing hours (sometimes significantly)
would result in little loss of net income but a large increase in non-employment
time. So, if ATRs are low, indicating high financial returns to enter employment,
but MTRs are high, it implies that financial returns to employment would be
similar at a lower hours level than the one shown. While these measures do
indicate the patterns of incentives that exist, it does not necessarily follow that
individuals would prefer to work fewer hours. A full model of labour supply
would be required to determine this.
These measures give some impression of the work incentive effects of the
benefit system but ignore one important part of the story — the scope of the HB
system. So, in the following tables, we also show the proportion of social rentersHousing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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in work receiving HB, to indicate how far the HB system extends up the income
scale and the proportion of tenants who would escape the HB system in work. We
also show a related measure, which is the average hours of work needed under
different HB systems to come off HB. Clearly, the more generous the HB system
is, the higher the number of hours that need to be worked to escape HB.
In conclusion, no one measure provides a complete description of benefit
dependency. ATRs, RRs and MTRs are useful measures of the financial gains that
a person can expect from moving into employment or changing their hours of
employment, although care must be taken in interpreting these measures. They are
not an adequate basis for determining how many people will move into or out of
work or will change their numbers of hours worked. For that, one needs a model of
labour supply decisions which we have not attempted to provide here. In addition,
particular care must be taken with the interpretation of these measures for
unwaged individuals. The level of the calculated financial returns to work will
depend on an assumption of the potential wage of that individual, their potential
hours of work and the employment decisions of their spouse. These can only be
assumed or estimated, and these assumptions are crucial to the levels shown.
IV. FINANCIAL RETURNS TO EMPLOYMENT
FOR SOCIAL RENTERS
Given the structure of the HB system and a series of measures of its impact on
work incentives, we need to be able to apply these to a sample of the population to
gain some idea of the actual effects on individuals. We have used IFS’s tax and
benefit model, TAXBEN,
6 to look at measures of returns to employment for a
representative sample of the UK population. We have used data from three years
of the Family Expenditure Survey, 1991 to 1993, with all incomes uprated to 1995
earnings levels. This gives us a sample of roughly 4,000 households from the
social rented sector. We use the 1996–97 tax and benefit system as the basis for
calculating our work incentive measures.
For those who are currently in work, we need to calculate the incomes that they
would receive out of work. This can be done given what we know about the
families’ characteristics and the rules of the benefit system. For those currently
unemployed, the problem is more difficult. We need to know what their in-work
income would be. This involves estimating an hourly wage
7 that they would
receive and specifying the hours that they would work. In general, we will
                                                                                                                             
6See Giles and McCrae (1995).
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calculate our results at 40 hours, which roughly proxies the decision to work full-
time.
8
To estimate wages for those out of work, we ran regressions that used data on
those in work to predict the wages based on such variables as age, education and
region of residence. The results from this simple procedure will not be exactly
‘correct’ but they are our best estimates of the potential wages that could be
earned by unwaged social tenants.
9 The general tenor of our results is robust to the
exact method used for predicting wage levels. The actual distribution for
employees and the estimated distribution for those not in work is shown in Table
1.
This shows, most importantly, that the wages earned by social renters are low.
The mean for male social tenants is £6.60 per hour, and 10 per cent of men in this
tenure group receive less than £3.75 per hour. Even at the top end of the
distribution, male wages are still relatively low: the 90th percentile wage is less
than £10 an hour, little more than the 1995 male mean wage of £8.91
10 across the
whole population. That almost the entire distribution of wage levels in the social
rented sector is below the economy-wide average is an indication of how
concentrated in low-wage jobs social renters are. Women’s wages in this sector
are also very low. Half earn less than £4 per hour.
1. Employed Social Renters
Using the gross weekly income and the hours of employed individuals in the FES,
we calculated the levels of replacement rates, average tax rates, the proportion of
                                                                                                                             
8In Giles et al. (1996), we also consider the returns to working 20 hours, to capture the financial returns to part-time
working.
9In particular, we make no correction for selection bias. The use of a two-step estimator with family composition as
the identifying restriction produced insignificant selection terms. However, our feeling is that this result is probably
due to lack of information in the FES rather than that it demonstrates the non-existence of selection in the labour
market. See Giles et al. (1996, appendix H).
10Source: New Earnings Survey 1995.
TABLE 1
Summary Statistics of the Actual Hourly Wage Distribution










Mean 6.60 5.97 4.61 4.25
Median 6.10 5.93 4.00 3.97
10th percentile 3.75 4.64 2.61 3.50
90th percentile 9.74 7.22 7.02 5.25Housing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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tenants with high ATRs, the proportion with high marginal tax rates, the
proportion on housing benefit and the average number of hours that would have to
be worked to come off HB. The results are shown in Table 2, where men and
women are split into categories that represent reasonably homogeneous groups.
Some of the groups are not mutually exclusive and the sum of the population
totals for men and women will exceed the total. It is important to recognise that all
of the social tenants represented in Table 2 are in employment. Even if they appear
to face severe disincentives to employment, by virtue of the fact that they are
waged, they must derive greater benefit from employment than from being
unwaged.
Table 2 shows that the mean average tax rate for male social tenants is just
over 50 per cent while the mean replacement rate is just under 50 per cent. Forty-
four per cent of our male sample had ATRs in excess of 60 per cent. The highest
ATRs are faced by men with children and men with an unwaged spouse (clearly
some men fall into both these categories). Both of these groups are entitled to
relatively high out-of-work benefit levels, either because their children confer
greater needs for the family or their unwaged spouse provides little other income.
Entitlement to high levels of benefit out of work increases the range of income
over which benefit is withdrawn for a given wage level. This reduces the net gain
from employment.
Marginal tax rates follow a similar pattern, though only 15 per cent of the
employed sample have a MTR greater than 60 per cent because most earned
enough to escape from means-tested benefits. But this low average hides certain
groups that have much higher MTRs. Again, we see that men with children or
those with unwaged partners are more likely to have high MTRs because their
income is not high enough to escape the reach of means-tested benefits altogether.
This pattern is confirmed by the column showing the average number of hours of
work required to escape HB. Overall, an average of 17 hours of work is required,
but this rises to an average of 27 hours for men with an unwaged partner.
Many of the patterns we observe for employed male social renters are repeated
for women. ATRs and RRs are highest for women with an unwaged spouse —
though there are relatively few such families. We also see that single women and
employed lone parents face high ATRs. In general, ATRs are lower for employed
women than for employed men because a large proportion of them will be
secondary earners with partners on incomes that would not entitle them to any
means-tested benefits even if they were to leave waged employment.
It is interesting, though, to compare the pattern of replacement rates with that
of average tax rates. Women with waged spouses have rather high RRs and low
ATRs. This reflects exactly the difference between the two measures discussed in
the previous section. Replacement rates measure an income effect that is not
picked up by average tax rates and their high level is an indication that women
with working spouses would have a relatively high income level out of work.TABLE 2


















Men Single 31% 52% 44% 5% 10% 20 189
Unwaged spouse 59% 67% 73% 34% 15% 27 345
Waged spouse 47% 44% 23% 5% 2% 9 484
No children 41% 41% 18% 3% 4% 11 331
With children 58% 60% 58% 27% 9% 20 498
All men 48% 53% 44% 15% 8% 17 1,020
Women Single, no children 45% 56% 51% 17% 19% 20 185
Unwaged spouse 71% 57% 53% 54% 54% 30 181
Waged spouse 62% 20% 7% 6% 3% 2 535
No children 58% 26% 11% 10% 12% 9 343
With children 69% 31% 24% 26% 18% 10 373
Lone parent 68% 42% 34% 77% 71% 37 168
All women 61% 36% 27% 27% 25% 16 1,073Housing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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ATRs do not pick up this effect and are very low for this group because they are
generally entitled to no benefits when out of work and so none are withdrawn when
work is entered.
Compared with men, women with an unwaged spouse have to work more hours
to escape HB as their wages are typically lower, but those with a waged spouse
have to work fewer hours because their partner’s earnings are likely to be higher.
On average, women in couples with or without children have to work fewer hours,
for precisely the same reason. But perhaps the most striking feature of this column
is that lone parents already on average have to be employed 37 hours a week to
escape HB.
2. Unwaged Social Renters
We now consider what effect the current tax and benefit system would have on the
incomes of unwaged social renters if they were to take up employment. This we do
using their estimated wages, as described above, and we assume that they are
working 40 hours at this wage.
Again, the direct measures of the financial return from employment are the
ATRs and RRs, but the other figures in Table 3 are also instructive. Very high
MTRs at the particular hours level chosen indicate that these individuals would
lose little income by working fewer hours. Hence, if ATRs are low but MTRs are
high, it indicates that there would be a similar financial incentive for an individual
to enter waged employment at a lower hours level than the one chosen here. The
same is equally true if the proportion on HB in work is high or the hours of
employment needed to escape HB are high. On the other hand, if the ATR and the
other measures of welfare dependency are high, it indicates there is little financial
net gain from employment.
We look first at the incentives faced by unwaged men. Table 3 shows the
results for the unwaged social renters that correspond to Table 2 for employed
social renters. The imposition of 40 hours in work differentiates these results from
the employed sample above, where we can observe hours levels. For men, this is a
relatively unimportant problem because the vast majority work in a small range of
hours around 40 hours per week. But it does complicate some simple comparisons
between the tables which might well be driven by varying hours levels as well as
other features.
For nearly all groups of unwaged men, ATR levels and the proportion with
ATRs greater than 60 per cent exceed those for the corresponding group in the
employed sample. This reflects two factors. First, currently unwaged men would
expect lower earnings than currently waged men. Second, they might have
particular characteristics that entitle them to more income out of work than the in-
work group would get. In Table 4, we compare the actual out-of-work income of
unwaged social renters with the modelled out-of-work income of socialTABLE 3


















Men Single 35% 58% 41% 6% 1% 19 171
Unwaged spouse 68% 75% 88% 48% 10% 26 380
Waged spouse 56% 54% 33% 5% — 10 83
No children 51% 60% 58% — — 19 117
With children 71% 75% 85% 54% 11% 25 346
All men 58% 67% 68% 32% 6% 22 638
Women Single, no children 44% 61% 62% 6% 6% 22 123
Unwaged spouse 76% 74% 86% 74% 40% 35 479
Waged spouse 64% 34% 15% 8% 3% 4 319
No children 66% 55% 50% 27% 27% 22 165
With children 73% 59% 59% 53% 25% 23 633
Lone parent 62% 58% 52% 96% 36% 37 466
All women 66% 58% 56% 60% 27% 27 1,390Housing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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renters in employment. In most cases, we do indeed find that the out-of-work
income of the employed would be lower than the actual income of the unwaged.
It is particularly striking that the ATRs for men with children and those with
unwaged spouses are much higher than those for the corresponding men already in
employment. More of these men face very low financial returns to work than the
men we observe in employment. The pictures for the measures of MTRs and
dependence on benefits in work show the same story. Relative to the employed
group, the unwaged men face higher MTRs and would have to work more than
five more hours to escape HB than the group already in employment. Overall,
then, unwaged men face smaller net financial gain from waged employment, but
the pattern between different types of unwaged men is very similar to that of
waged men.
The figures are much more dramatic if we restrict the number of hours worked
to 20. At this hours level, the average ATR for all unwaged men is 79 per cent, 68
per cent of men would have a MTR greater than 60 per cent and 53 per cent of
men would still be in receipt of HB in work. Consequently, part-time work will
seem especially unattractive to these social renters, particularly if they are the
primary earners in a couple.
The figures for unwaged women show similar results to those for men. ATRs
are higher across the board as wages are, on average, lower than for employed
women. The difference between relatively low ATRs for women with a waged
partner and very high ATRs for women with an unwaged partner is striking. It
serves to highlight much previous work indicating how relatively financially
TABLE 4




Actual income of unwaged
Men Single 70.74 79.58
Unwaged spouse 149.70 162.03
Waged spouse 154.93 183.76
No children 124.10 126.80
With children 168.75 178.92
Women Single, no children 73.57 85.12
Unwaged spouse 283.53 307.53
Waged spouse 402.07 412.15
No children 339.80 297.56
With children 402.08 362.99
Lone parent 137.77 143.56Fiscal Studies
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unrewarding it is for many women married to unemployed men to work themselves
(Kell and Wright, 1990).
Nearly all lone parents would have a MTR greater than 60 per cent, although
nearly two-thirds would no longer receive HB in work at 40 hours. The average
number of hours needing to be worked to escape HB for this group, though, is 37.
The high MTRs for nearly all lone parents imply that their earnings would not be
high enough to float them off family credit even at full-time hours.
Restricting the hours worked by women to 20 produces some interesting
results. As we would expect, the proportion with high MTRs is even greater at
lower hours levels for all groups of women, but the average ATR for lone parents
is 10 percentage points lower. This is entirely a reflection of the earnings
disregards in the means-tested benefit system that allow a little paid work before
benefits are withdrawn. These can increase the gain from employment but only up
to the level of the disregard; any employment in excess of this suffers from
exceedingly high withdrawal rates.
V. REFORMS
With current wage and rent levels and the current HB system, it is evident that
there are many social tenants who do indeed face rather low returns to work. We
need now to consider possible policy responses that might ameliorate this
situation. Here, we consider three possible policies, and, to make them
comparable, we assume that we have £1 billion to spend on each. The three
policies we consider are
1. reducing rents by 25 per cent to return them to their real level in 1988 — the
net cost of this is £1 billion and the gross cost more than £2.7 billion;
2. reducing the HB taper from 65 per cent to 30 per cent;
3. increasing earnings disregards by £50 per week.
To make the reforms comparable, the costings of options (2) and (3) assume that
the reform is only made in the social rented sector. In addition, we consider the
impact of restricting the proportion of rent eligible for HB, again in the social
rented sector.
We can consider each reform in turn, using a simplified version of the budget
constraint. In Figure 3, the line EFGD is the simplified budget constraint of a
family. For the range EF, the family is on income support and faces a 100 per cent
withdrawal rate. After F, its gross income is sufficiently high that housing benefit
starts to be withdrawn. At point G, all housing benefit has been tapered away, and
the only withdrawals from additional gross income come through the tax and
National Insurance systems. Note that this is the budget constraint for a family. In
a couple, if a person’s partner is working, then the individual’s zero hours point
will not be at E.Housing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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The effect of a rent decrease is to shift the point G, at which the individual
comes off housing benefit, to the left (i.e. fewer hours of work). For those in the
range EH, this has no effect on their after-rent income. They continue to pay the
same amount of rent net of housing benefit, which is zero for those in the range
EF. For those in the range HG, the reduction in rent removes their entitlement to
housing benefit. However, their after-rent income will have increased, as the
amount that they actually pay in rent will have been reduced. For those beyond G
(i.e. those not receiving housing benefit before the reform), the effect is to increase
their income by the full amount of the rent decrease.
It is clear from Figure 3 that ATRs at hours greater than at point H will be
reduced as after-rent incomes rise. Equally, the range of high MTRs is reduced as
housing benefit, covering lower rent levels, runs out more quickly. It is also worth
noting, though, that lowering rent levels has an income effect for anyone above the
point H. Beyond this point, the reduction in rent might provide some incentive to
reduce hours in the knowledge that living standards could be maintained with
fewer hours of employment.
The effect of cutting rents is compared directly with the effect of cutting the
housing benefit taper in Figure 4. Here, the original budget constraint lies along
the line EFGD. Remember that the effect of cutting rents is to shift the point at
which housing benefit is escaped down from G towards H, at which point the
steeper section of the budget constraint now begins.
The effect of cutting the taper is rather different. The flatter part of the budget
constraint starts at the same point but is less flat, with the consequence that it is
longer, stretching from F to I. Two effects are obvious. Anyone currently on
FIGURE 3
Simplified Impact of a Rent Decrease
Title:  Johnson fig 3
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  7/2/97 10:19 amFiscal Studies
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housing benefit is made better off by this reform, and many of them will do better
from this than from a cut in rents. But the hours of work required to escape
housing benefit are raised from those at G to those at I. By comparison with a cut
in rents, it is clear that a taper reduction gives more help to those on relatively low
incomes. Whereas nobody working more hours than at I gains from the taper cut,
everybody in this range gains from the rent reduction.
While MTRs for those in the range FG are reduced, MTRs for those in the
range GI are increased. More hours of work are required to take someone off
housing benefit altogether, but the returns to working are reduced for each extra
hour past G.
Finally, bear in mind the effects on second earners. If the first earner is already
working — at G, say — the effect of a reduced taper will be to cut the return to
work by the second earner. The family income is higher at G, but this is tapered
away as the second earner works more hours. This person’s RR will have been
increased as the reform has increased their out-of-work income.
The third reform we consider is to increase the earnings disregards. At an
initial cost of £1 billion, these disregards could be increased by £50 each. This
would mean that a couple could earn £110 per week before any of this income
would be counted in the formula for determining housing benefit. The reason this
number is so large relative to the size of the rent reduction that could be afforded
at a similar cost is just that among all social renters — above and below pension
age — only a small proportion are currently in work. And this is the only group on
which more money would be spent in the first instance if earnings disregards were
increased.
FIGURE 4
Comparison of Rent Reduction with Lowering Taper
Title:  Johnson fig 4
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  29/1/97 4:26 pmHousing Benefit and Financial Returns to Employment
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The effect is essentially to increase the range over which the person receives
full housing benefit. Consider the formula for calculating excess income:
Excess income = (Earnings – Disregard) + Other income – Needs.
An increase in the disregard allows earnings to be higher before the person has
positive excess income. This shifts the point at which the person’s housing benefit
starts to be tapered. In terms of Figure 5, this can be interpreted as a shift in the
line FG to F*G*. In the range FF*, people continue to receive full housing benefit
while their earnings rise. At F*, all of the increase in the disregard has been used
up, and housing benefit begins to be tapered until, at G*, it has all been tapered
away.
The potential impacts are fairly clear. Again, more people will be brought
within the housing benefit system as more money needs to be earned in order to
escape it. For those working above G*, there is no effect on any of our measures.
For those originally in the range FG, incomes in work, and therefore the return to
work, will rise. MTRs will be reduced only for those in the range FF*. But note
the shape of the new budget constraint. There is a convex kink at F*. An incentive
is certainly created for people to move from no work to this point, but there is also
an incentive created for movements down the budget constraint. The returns to
working above F*, relative to F*, are cut back significantly.
Again, second earners are more likely to start on the housing benefit taper as a
result of this reform and their work incentives are therefore likely to be reduced.
FIGURE 5
Simplified Impact of Raising Earnings Disregards
Title:  Johnson fig 5
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
CreationDate:  29/1/97 4:27 pmFiscal Studies
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A summary of the actual effects of these three reforms is shown in Table 5.
11 A
number of patterns against which to judge the policies can be discerned in the
results.
First, it is clear that the cut in rent levels affects the greatest number of people.
Nearly 90 per cent of currently unwaged men would see their predicted ATRs fall.
The one group for which only a minority would have reduced ATRs from this
policy is women currently in work. This is because most women in work have a
spouse who is also in work. In that case, a cut in rent effectively increases their
out-of-work income by as much as it increases their in-work income. But while
most people do see a reduction in their ATR as a result of a reduction in rent, the
falls in their ATRs are only rather small, averaging just four percentage points.
On the other hand, the rent reduction does have a positive effect on the depth of
benefit dependency. The average number of hours of work required to escape HB
would be fewer than 20 for all these groups, though for single parents by
themselves the average hours required would be 25. The reason that a high
proportion of waged women are still on HB in work is just because many of them
work only part-time. Again, note that these figures are not directly comparable
with those for unwaged women because, for the unwaged group, we have assumed
that 40 hours are worked per week. The results are significantly altered if we
assume that they would only work 20 hours per week. In this case, only a third
would see a fall in their ATRs, and nearly half would still be on HB at these hours
levels.
Overall, a cut in rent levels has positive but rather thinly-spread benefits, with
average improvements in ATRs only rather small. The other two reforms have
bigger but less widespread effects. In both cases, those who benefit gain more than
was the case with lower rents, but escaping the HB system becomes much more
difficult. The very fact that so many people have their ATRs reduced by a
lowering of the taper is evidence that they are still on the HB taper following this
reform because, as can be seen from Figure 4 above, it is only in this case that the
ATR can be affected.
For some groups, the last two reforms would make it virtually impossible to
escape from HB. More than 90 per cent of lone parents would still be on HB even
at 40 hours of work, as would three-quarters of currently unwaged men with
children. Given results from qualitative surveys (see, for example, Ford, Kampson
and England (1995)), which suggest that many people do not realise that HB is
available in work, the potential positive effects of such a policy are probably less
than a formal description of the system would suggest.
The effects of having higher earnings disregards would be similar on these
measures, though the ATR reductions would be more dramatic. As can be seen
from Figure 5, the incentive to work at the earnings disregard level would be
                                                                                                                             
11A more detailed breakdown is available in Giles et al. (1996).TABLE 5























Lower rent Waged men 70% –4% — — 5% 13 14%
Waged women 28% –6% — — 21% 11 26%
Unwaged men 89% –4% — — 2% 17 31%
Unwaged women 69% –4% — — 8% 19 58%
Lower taper Waged men 29% –7% 22% 5% 34% 3  4 14%
Waged women 22% –11% 23% 13% 45% 34 21%
Unwaged men 52% –6% 9% 5% 54% 41 31%
Unwaged women 67% –10% 16% 7% 70% 57 58%
Higher disregards Waged men 35% –14% 24% 10% 43% 41 33%
Waged women 25% –20% 27% 24% 51% 37 35%
Unwaged men 60% –14% 6% 11% 61% 46 48%
Unwaged women 69% –18% 16% 17% 72% 59 68%Fiscal Studies
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very substantial. This is not picked up by any of our measures, though the high
proportions with high marginal tax rates are indicative of this problem.
One final possibility that is worth considering is restricting the amount of rent
that would be covered by housing benefit. So instead of 100 per cent of rent being
eligible for HB, only 75 per cent, say, might be covered. This would obviously
make tenants worse off. The effects on our ATR measures would be exactly the
same as the effects of a rent reduction.
Figure 6 shows the impact of both reforms on an example family. For ease of
comprehension, this figure is somewhat different in style from those shown earlier
but it demonstrates the same points. As before, hours of work are on the horizontal
axis and net income is on the vertical. The lower line shows the effect of the lower
eligibility, the higher line the effect of the lower rent. The difference between the
two is simply that the net after-housing-costs income for restricted eligibility is
£7.50
12 below that for reduced rent at all hours levels. This is due to the fact that
HB is affected in the same way by the reforms: they both reduce the rent eligible
for HB by 25 per cent, either by reducing gross rents by 25 per cent or, in this
reform, by simply deeming rents to be 25 per cent lower when they have not in
fact changed. Therefore the only difference felt by households is that, in this
reform, they will always have higher housing costs and hence lower incomes at all
levels.
As the budget constraint has simply been shifted downward, the ATRs are the
same at every point. The ATR is the ratio of the change in net income to the
change in gross income. As the lines have the same shape, the difference in net
                                                                                                                             
12This is the amount by which the family’s rent would be reduced — that is, £30 % 0.25.
FIGURE 6
Impact of Reducing Eligible Rent versus Lowering Rent
Title:  Johnson fig 6
Creator:  Freehand 5.0
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income between any two points will be the same even if the line is shifted
downward.
While ATRs and MTRs are the same under both reforms, we would not expect
the labour supply responses to be necessarily identical. We have seen above that
the difference in after-housing-costs income will be identical under each reform
between any two hours points. However, in the case of lowering rent, this change
is produced by an increase in after-housing-costs income when not on HB. For the
restricted eligibility case, the difference is caused by a fall in after-housing-costs
income while on HB. If additional income is more valuable when other income is
lower, restricting eligibility will have a greater effect on incentives than reducing
rent. But to determine whether this is significant at current rent levels, a full
labour supply model is needed.
Although this reform gives the same results as reducing rent and saves the
exchequer money, its costs are obvious. If the benefit system currently provides a
minimum standard of living acceptable to society, restricting rent in HB will force
living standards below this minimum.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
A combination of low actual and potential earnings, high rents and the current
housing benefit system leads to a situation in which a large number of council and
Housing Association tenants are in a position to enjoy only small net financial
benefits from work. We have shown not only that this is possible in theory but that
these problems are faced in reality by many individuals.
The policy conclusions are not clear-cut. If potential wages for these groups
were higher, the problem would be greatly mitigated. The government has no
power to increase wages to the required extent. A minimum wage of £3.50 or £4
per hour would not do the trick. The obvious policy response is to cut rents in the
social sector. We have shown that this would be a move in the right direction in
terms of increasing the available returns to work, but the overall effects on returns
would only be small. Furthermore, in a sector where access, in many parts of the
country at least, is rationed, there are other issues of equity at stake. With a rent
much lower than private sector alternatives, the benefits from being an ‘insider’
could be greater.
Larger effects on returns for particular individuals can be secured by adjusting
the housing benefit system. We considered two possible changes — reducing
withdrawal tapers and increasing earnings disregards. For a similar net cost, each
had greater effects on potential returns to work for those affected than did cutting
rents. The downside of these policies is that they might ‘trap’ a large majority of
social tenants on housing benefit for ever, if there is no real scope for higher
earnings. In addition, high earnings disregards provide strong incentives for people
to earn at particular levels. If the main aim of policy is to give people adequateFiscal Studies
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returns to doing some work, and continued dependence on benefit is not of serious
concern, then these might be appropriate policies; but these are strong conditions.
Other policies which involve reducing the eligibility of tenants for HB are
clearly cheaper and could have positive labour supply effects, but they will also
have damaging effects on the living standards of the poorest. A combination of
rent reductions and restrictions in HB eligibility might be worth considering, but
the direct effects would be regressive, making relatively well-off social tenants
better off and the poorest social tenants worse off.
As is often the case in such circumstances, the benefit system offers a number
of directions in which policy can be moved. Unfortunately, it does not offer a
single ‘solution’ to a problem whose causes spread well beyond the reach of the
benefit system.
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